Ohio State University Moritz College of
Law
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Working Paper
Series
Year 

Paper 

Rehnquist and Federalism: An Empirical
Perspective
Ruth Colker∗

∗

Kevin Scott†

Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, colker.2@osu.edu
Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University, kevin.scott@ttu.edu
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commercially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
†

http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art13
Copyright c 2005 by the authors.

Rehnquist and Federalism: An Empirical
Perspective
Ruth Colker and Kevin Scott

Abstract

We attempt to articulate a vision of federalism, particularly the Rehnquist version of federalism. We find that there is little consistent thought on the role of the
judiciary in protecting federalism. This lack of consensus makes it difficult to predict the decisions federalists might make, but we attempt to outline Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s contributions to understanding the role courts should play in protecting federalism. We then attempt to assess if Rehnquist adheres to his own vision
of federalism. Using his votes since his elevation to Chief Justice in 1986, we
test several hypotheses designed to determine if Chief Justice Rehnquist demonstrates the respect for the balance between state and federal governments which
he has articulated in so many of his opinions. We generally find support for the
proposition that Chief Justice Rehnquist adheres to the tenets of federalism. We
conclude that, while there is an ideological component to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s jurisprudence, there also appears to be evidence of a sincere commitment
to the protection of the line between national and state governments.

Rehnquist and Federalism: An Empirical Perspective
Ruth Colker *
Kevin Scott**
Commentators generally agree that the Supreme Court has spurred a “federalism
revolution” during Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s tenure.1 Nonetheless, the term
“federalism revolution,” is unclear, in part, because the early federalists offered little
commentary on the proper judicial role under federalism. Arguably, this uncertainty
continues today.
Broadly speaking, we can think of federalism as reflecting a respect for the
relationship between state and federal government. Under federalism principles, Congress
should be hesitant to interfere with state sovereignty. Similarly, the states should respect
Congress’ authority and not take actions that would jeopardize our national interests.
Historically, the federalists sought a greater role for the federal government than had
existed under the Articles of Confederation. Today, by contrast, we often think of the
federalists as seeking a more restrained role for Congress as compared with the states.
But what is the role of the judiciary in this arrangement? Is a federalist inherently a
restraintist, believing in a limited role for the judiciary? What is the role of the state
judiciary as compared to the federal judiciary? The early federalists were restraintists and
did not envision a broad role for the judiciary in maintaining the proper federalism balance.
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for providing Professor Colker with a Distinguished Scholar Award, which we were able to use to
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1 See generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 M ICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); A.
Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New ‘On
the Record’ Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001); William W.
Buzbee, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2001).
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Today, by contrast, some might argue that the Court is more generally activist and
that even the federalists consider the judiciary to have a significant role in maintaining
what it considers to be the proper allocation of power between the federal and state
governments. Finally, how does the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment affect
federalism? The early federal ists could not have anticipated the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment with its direct limitations on state action and allocation of greater
power to Congress. We can only speculate as to how they may have modified their version
of federalism had they known of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has been a strong proponent of federalism. He has
repeatedly invoked federalism principles, first in dissent, and then in majority opinions. As
reflected in his opinions, Rehnquist’s version of federalism appears to be more restraintist
than the version propounded by Justice Antonin Scalia. Rehnquist also appears to consider
the Fourteenth Amendment to create an important source of increased power for Congress
in regulating the states.
In this chapter, we will use both qualitative and quantitative tools to understand
more fully Rehnquist’s version of federalism. Using qualitative analysis, we will argue that
Rehnquist’s version of federalism is different than the one propounded by the early
federalists. In addition, we will argue that it differs from that of Justice Scalia. Then,
using quantitative analysis, we will ask whether Rehnquist’s decisions are consistent with
the federalism model that he propounds in his opinions.
I.

Three Versions of Federalism

A.

The Classical View of Federalism

Today, federalism is often considered to be a states’ rights perspective but the antifederalists had the strongest states’ rights perspective in the Eighteenth Century. James
Madison sought to create a balanced system of government whereby both the federal
2
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art13

government and the states had an appropriate scope of power. To him, “the federal
constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local, and particular to the state legislatures.2”
Madison emphasized that the proposed government would be a federal, not a
national government. The federal character was achieved through the selection of the
Senate and the selection of the President. Each state would receive the same number of
Senators and those Senators would be chosen by the state legislatures. The Presidential
election would use a winner-take-all method of counting electoral votes on a state by state
basis. Madison believed that these rules would protect the states. “Thus, each of the
principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor
of the state governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more
likely to beget a disposition too obsequious, than too overbearing toward them.3”
In general, the Framers did not emphasize the importance of the judicial role in
protecting the constitutional design. Alexander Hamilton gave the most consideration to
the proper role of the judiciary. Hamilton understood that the judiciary, in some sense, is
beholden to the other branches of government because it cannot enforce its rulings. Hence,
some might call it the “weakest of the three departments of power.4” Yet, the independence
of the judiciary was an essential aspect of the proposed new government. “[T]here is no
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.”
He then delineated the role of the courts in the proposed system of government:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a
limited constitution . . . . Limitations . . . can be preserved in practice no other
way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty is must be
to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void.

2Federalist

No. 10 at 22.
No. 45 at 100.
4Federalist No. 78 at 143.
3Federalist
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Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing.
Hamilton does not specify whether this judicial role should be a broad or narrow one but his
recognition that the judiciary is the weakest branch might suggest that he thought the
judiciary should use its powers sparingly to maintain its integrity.
More modern writers also contemplated the judicial role under federalism. James
Thayer and Herbert Wechsler have played a central role in the development of a judicial
role for federalists, arguing for a restrained judicial role. Thayer defended the position that
courts should only declare laws unconstitutional “when those who have the right to make
laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, – so clear that it is
not open to rational question.”5 Nonetheless, he considered it important for courts to have
the power to declare laws unconstitutional. Otherwise, the constitution “is reduced to
nothing.”
Although Thayer argued for judicial restraint, he suggested that the Supreme Court
should be sensitive to whether a case is being appealed from a state or federal court. In this
context, he makes two important points. First, he emphasizes the importance of the
supremacy clause. “If a State legislature passes a law which is impeached in the due course
of litigation before the national courts, as being in conflict with the supreme law of the land,
those courts may have to ask themselves a question different from that which would be
applicable if the enactments were those of a co-ordinate department . . . The judiciary now
speaks as representing a paramount constitution and government, whose duty it is, in all
its departments, to allow to that constitution nothing less than its just and true
interpretation; and have fixed this, to guard against any inroads from without.”

James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 144 (1893)
5
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Second, and related, Thayer postulates that judges should be generally deferential to
the views of a coordinate branch of government. Hence, state court judges would be
deferential to the views of the state legislature and be disinclined to invalidate their
legislation as violative of the constitution. By emphasizing the importance of deferring to
the views of a coordinate branch of government, Thayer implied that a federal judge need
not defer to the views of the state legislature, particularly when the state’s highest court
has validated those legislative acts. One might argue, then, that a federalist judge would
be less deferential to a state court’s review of state action than similar review by a federal
court.
One must be careful not to overstate Thayer’s view about the federal courts’
relationship to state government. Thaye r’s view is predicated on the assumption that it
will be extremely rare for state government to violate the Constitution because his work
predates use of the Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle for incorporation. From his
perspective, states had broad autho rity to enact legislation. The only meaningful limitation
on the states would be the Supremacy Clause – when Congress had the power to pre-empt a
field, chose to pre-empt the field, and the states did not honor those limitations. Thayer
would therefore have expected that courts would rarely deal with situations in which the
states had arguably violated the Constitution. But in instances in which the states may
have violated the Supremacy Clause, he did not consider it likely that the state courts
would vigorously enforce that constitutional principle. Hence, the federal courts would play
an important role in protecting the federal government’s prerogatives.
Herbert Wechsler also did not consider courts to have a central role in the
maintenance of a federal system. “[T]he national political process in the United States –
and especially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the central
government – is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the
5
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center on the domain of the states . . . . Federal intervention as against the states is thus
primarily a matter for congressional determination in our system as it stands.”6
Like Thayer, Wechsler envisioned the function of the courts in a federal system to be
preservation of the Supremacy Clause, but this did not mean that he envisioned the courts
as actively engaged in the policy-making process—that was to be left to the elected
branches. According to Wechsler, “while the Court has an important function in [preemption], the crucial point is that its judgments here are subject to reversal by Congress,
which can consent to action by the states that otherwise would be invalidated . . . . The
Court makes the decisive judgment only when – and to the extent that – Congress has not
laid down the resolving rule.” On the other hand, Wechsler saw a fundamentally different
role for the courts in protecting individual rights:
In this latter area of the constitutional protection of the individual against
the government, both federal and state, subordination of the Court to
Congress would defeat the purpose of judicial mediation. For this is where
the political processes cannot be relied upon to introduce their own
correctives – except to the limited extent that individuals or small minorities
may find a champion in some important faction
The classical version of federalism and the Thayer/Wechsler version are only
modestly different. Both versions are restraintist while recognizing a legitimate
federal judicial role in protecting the Supremacy Clause. The important difference
is that Wechsler envisions a somewhat active role for the courts in the protection of
individual rights, because he takes account of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
development of his views.
B.

Federalism Since the 1970’s: The Demise of Wechsler

Although the early federalists appear to have advocated a restrained role for the
judiciary, a more activist version of federalism began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s.
Herbert Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954)
6
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Some political scientists have argued that this development was not a genuine reflection of
federalist principles; instead, it was an example of the Supreme Court imposing its
ideological preferences on Congress.7 Within legal circles, a genuine federalism explanation
is offered, with commentators suggesting that the Court has grown wary of Congress
dramatically overstepping its proper authority.8 We have entered the federalism versus
political ideology debate in previous work but leave that issue to the side for the purposes of
this chapter.9
The modern federalist position on the Tenth Amendment is reflected in Justice
Powell’s dissenting opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority .10
Justice Powell argued for a vigorous judicial role to protect the states when Congress
violates the Tenth Amendment by overreaching in its use of the commerce clause, stating:
“Professor Wechsler, whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court
today, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with current
reality.” To Powell, the growth of the federal government had obviated the position
advocated by Wechsler and his predecessors. Justice Powell also disagreed with Wechsler’s
premise that members of Congress, because they are elected from states, would protect
state sovereignty. Instead, he posited that they would have a national, not local,

See generally, Sue Davis, Rehnquist and State Courts: Federalism Revisited, 45 THE WESTERN
POLITICAL QUARTERLY 772 (1992); Harold J. Spaeth, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: An Assessment in
AN ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARD: ESSAYS ON THE U NITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 94-95
(D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. ed. 1991); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
8 See. e.g., Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643 (1996); John C.
Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997).
9 See Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action During the
Rehnquist Era, 88 VIRGINIA L. REV.1301 (2002).
7

10469

U.S. 528 (1984).
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perspective. The modern federalist position has therefore evolved from one of judicial
restraint to one of active judicial enforcement of the principles of state sovereignty.11
Justice Scalia has been the bluntest proponent of action by the Court in defense of
federalism. He has said:
My Court is fond of saying that acts of Congress come to the Court with the
presumption of constitutionality. That presumption reflects Congress’s
status as a coequal branch of government with its own responsibilities to the
Constitution. But if Congress is going to take the attitude that it will do
anything it can get away with and let the Supreme Court worry about the
Constitution . . . then perhaps that presumption is unwarranted.12
This runs contrary to the assertions of some early federalists like Thayer and Wechsler.
Thayer, in particular, argued that the Court should presume the constitutionality of
Congress’s conduct and only strike such legislation where there is “no room for reasonable
doubt.” Scalia criticized the Congress’ recent practice of creating expedited procedures for
the courts to assess the constitutionality of legislation. Scalia argued that by doing so,
Congress is flouting its unconstitutional conduct by readily acknowledging that it may have
passed unconstitutional legislation.
This second version of federalism is less restraintist than the view offered by the
early federalists. In addition, it appears to be more protective of states’ interests. We
would therefore expect that if this model explained the voting behavior of a federalist jurist
that voting behavior would be consistent with the views expressed by states in amicus
briefs.
C.

Rehnquist’s Federalism

See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46
VILLANOVA L. REV. 951, 952 (2001) (arguing that “federal courts have a role in safeguarding state
sovereignty that is as legitimate and essential as that generally acknowledged to be both necessary
and constitutionally mandated for the protection of individual rights.”)
11

12Antonin

Scalia, Telecommunications Law and Policy Symposium (Apr. 18, 2000). (transcribed from a videotape
loaned by the Law Review of Michigan State University – Detroit College of Law).
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While Rehnquist played an early and active role in pushing the Court to adopt a
more activist posture with respect to enforcing federalist principles, his version of
federalism does not appear to be as activist as the one propounded by Scalia because, like
Wechsler and Thayer, he seems to envision a role for the Court in the protection of
individual rights even when Congressional protection of individual rights seems to trounce
on state’s rights.
Associate Justice Rehnquist played an early role in the articulation of a strong role
for the federal courts in protecting federalism in his dissent in Fry v. United States,13 three
years after joining the Court. In 1975, he was the lone Justice to articulate this
perspective. The issue in Fry was the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, which authorized the President to issue orders and regulations to stabilize wages and
salaries at levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970. Not only did this statute
apply to the workforce generally, but it was understood to apply to the conduct of state
government. Hence, two state employees brought suit to invalidate the statute so that they
could receive a salary increase that the state of Ohio had approved. The state employees
challenged the statute under the Tenth Amendment as improperly interfering with state
sovereignty.
The majority upheld the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act, relying
on the Court’s holding in Maryland v. Wirtz14 that the Fair Labor Standards Act could
constitutionally be applied to schools and hospitals run by states. (Douglas and Stewart
dissented, arguing that the Tenth Amendment protected state sovereignty from such
regulation, given the excessive cost that would accompany enforcement of the FLSA.)
Justice Stewart joined the majority in Fry; Justice Douglas would have dismissed the writ

13
14

421 U.S. 542 (1975).
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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as improvidently granted. Hence, in dissent, Justice Rehnquist was alone in extending
Douglas and Stewart’s dissent in Wirtz to Fry.
Justice Rehnquist was not on the Court when Wirtz was decided so Fry was his first
opportunity to convey his view of federalism and the judicial role. Building on the Court’s
decision in Hans v. Louisiana15 in which it relied on the “pre-understanding” of the
Eleventh Amendment to protect a state from litigation, Rehnquist argued that many
aspects of state sovereignty are protected “quite apart from the provisions of the Tenth
Amendment.” “Both Amendments [the Tenth and Eleventh] are simply examples of the
understand ing of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that the States were
sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative authority could be
superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was competent to act, Congress was
nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it were just another individual or business
enterprise subject to regulation.”
Having articulated an activist role for the judiciary in safeguarding federalism,
Rehnquist still had a challenging set of facts to assess, because the wage and salary ceilings
were put into place as part of national emergency legislation. One might argue under the
early federalist model that the states should defer to Congress in times of national
emergency, so the legislation should be upheld as constitutional. Rehnquist did not offer
much scrutiny of the facts. He simply concluded: “nor do I believe that the showing of
national emergency made here is sufficient to make this case one in which congressional
authority may be derived from sources other than the Commerce Clause.” He did
acknowledge, however, that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as a general
matter, can provide the authority for Congress to “impose significant restrictions on what
would otherwise be thought state prerogatives.” No Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment
15

134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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argument, however, was available in this case. Rehnquist therefore argued that Wirtz
should be overruled but that South Carolina v. Katzenbach,16 upholding the Voting Rights
Act, could still be understood to be valid precedent.
Rehnquist recognized that he was calling for the overturning of precedent which is
inconsistent with the notion of stare decisis. He subscribed to a weak version of stare
decisis in order to justify that step. He said: “important decisions of constitutional law are
not subject to the same command of stare decisis as are decisions of statutory questions.”17
This weak version of stare decisis would be quite inconsistent with the tenor of Thayer’s
judicially cautious federalism. Rehnquist justified this weak version of stare decisis in the
federalism context: “Surely there can be no more fundamental constitutional question than
that of the intention of the Framers of the Constitution as to how authority should be
allocated between the National and State Governments.”
Rehnquist made two important contributions to the development of a federalism
jurisprudence in Fry. First, he carved out an activist judicial role, even if that role required
the overturning of precedent. Second, he recognized the power of Congress to regulate
states and intrude on their sovereignty under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
but not under the Commerce Clause. In 1975, he was alone in taking this view.
Within a year, Rehnquist command ed a 5-4 majority of support for his federalism
views as articulated in National League of Cities v. Usery.18 Justice Blackmun filed the
pivotal concurrence to give Rehnquist a five vote majority. (Ironically, Robert Bork
defended the federal statute as Solicitor General.) The issue in Usery was essentially the
issue in Wirtz – the constitutionality of Congress applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to
state employees. Only two members of the Court had dissented from that conclusion in
16
17
18

388 U.S. 301 (1966).
421 U.S. at 559.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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1968. Now, however, a majority of the Court is willing to strike down the FLSA as applied
to the states because it results in the “forced relinquishment of important governmental
activities.” Not only did the FLSA impose substantial costs on state and local government
but it “displaces state policies regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of
those governmental services which their citizens require.”
Although the decision had far-reaching implications in reversing the recent decision
in Wirtz, the decision had cautious elements. First, Rehnquist was careful to note that the
decision applied only to Congress’ use of the commerce clause. He left open the possibility
that Congress might regulate the states and “affect integral operations” under the spending
power or Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, Rehnquist distinguished
rather than overruled Fry. In contrast to the FLSA, he found that the Economic
Stabilization Act, at issue in Fry, was a limited, temporary, national measure which
reduced the pressures upon state budgets rather than increased them. Thus, Rehnquist
left open the door the possibility that Congress, in the future, could use its emergency
powers to enact legislation which might intrude upon state sovereignty. Nonetheless,
Rehnquist made no attempt to distinguish Wirtz. He directly overruled that precedent,
implicitly relying on his view expressed in Fry that constitutional decisions are entitled to
less weight as stare decisis.
Rehnquist reiterated the moderate aspects of his federalism in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer.19 With no dissenters, Rehnquist again wrote the opinion of the Court. The issue in
this case was the authority of Congress to permit monetary damage awards against the
states in suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court upheld
this congressional authority, finding that Congress’ powers under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment necessarily limited the principle of state sovereignty embodied in
19

427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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the Constitution. Fitzpatrick therefore continued the line o f reasoning that Rehnquist had
acknowledged in Fry – that cases involving Congress’ authority under Section Five present
different problems than cases involving Congress’ commerce clause authority.
Although Rehnquist still adhered to the view that Congress’ Section Five authority
is broader than its Commerce Clause authority, with respect to regulating state action, his
decision in Rome v. United States20 suggested that he had moderated his views on the
extent of Congress’ authority under Section Five.
The issue in Rome was the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as
applied to Rome, Georgia. In 1965, the city of Rome made a number of changes to its
electoral scheme; under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, these changes required
preclearance. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required that the Attorney General may
only preclear a voting change if it “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”21 The City clai med that
Section 5 was unconstitutional, because Congress does not have authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment to ban practices that are discriminatory in effect, but lack
discriminatory intent.
In a 6-3 decision, the majority upheld Congress’ use of its Fourteenth Amendment
authority to create the preclearance rules. Justice Rehnquist dissented, issuing an opinion
that was joined by Justice Stewart. (Justice Stewart, of course, had dissented from the
majority’s holding in Wirtz and had a longstanding c oncern for federalism.) Echoing his
strong dissent in Fry, he castigated the Court for abandoning its proper judicial role. He
said:
While the presumption of constitutionality is due to any act of a coordinate branch of
the Federal Government or of one o f the States, it is this Court which is ultimately
20
21

446 U.S. 156 (1980).
42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
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responsible for deciding challenges to the exercise of power by those entities.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974). Today’s decision is nothing less than a total abdication of that authority,
rather than an exercise of the deference due to a coordinate branch of the
government.
The difference in tone between Rome and Usery is striking. In Usery, Rehnquist was
willing to revisit his own dissenting opinion in Fry and suggest limiting principles to a farreaching decision. In Rome, he came close to Scalia’s view of abandoning deference to a
coordinate branch of government altogether. The difference in tone, however, can easily be
attributed to the different role of these decisions. Usery was a majority decision for the
Court in which Rehnquist was trying to keep together a flimsy five vote majority (which
disappeared in less than a decade in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.)22 In Rome, Rehnquist was writing freely in dissent, only trying to maintain the
vote of one of his longstanding federalist compatriots. It is not surprising that his
language in dissent would be more extreme although it probably hints to his future path
where he often joins other federalists in striking down federal legislation, even legislation
enacted pursuant to Congress’ Section Five authority.
Rehnquist’s opinions lend support to two different models of federalism. When he
writes in dissent, he sometimes sounds more like the activist Scalia model of federalism
than like the early restraintist model of federalism. But when he writes the opinion of the
Court, he sounds more restraintist and more deferential to Congress’ powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Which model best describes his opinions from a quantitative
perspective? Does Rehnquist’s model of federalism have restraintist elements? Is he more
deferential to Congress when it has invoked its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment?
III. Hypotheses

22

469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Altho ugh we have identified three different models of federalism, there are some
elements common to each of these versions. Under these common elements, we posit that a
judge who adheres to federalism would:
q

First, demonstrate greater respect for the decisions of state courts than federal courts.23

q

Second, respect the articulated wishes of the states, as demonstrated by amici briefs
submitted by the states.

q

Third, treat states more as an equal to the federal government than a non-federalist
would. This is not to say that a federalist would treat states as equals to the federal
government, but the y should be less willing to invalidate state action than those of nonfederalists.

q

Fourth, there should be some notion of judicial restraint. The federalists should be
more restrained than the nonfederalists even if there is a range of restrained behavior
among the federalists.

q

Fifth, federalists should not hesitate to favor the federal government over the states
when the Supremacy Clause is at issue.
Additionally, these behaviors should be observable regardless of the ideological

implications of a vote to validate or invalidate action. We do not expect ideology to fail to
explain the votes of justices who have articulated a special interest in preserving the
federalist structure, but we do expect an independent effect for the hypothesized behaviors
once we have accounted for the ideological implications of each case.
Finally, there may be different views of federalism articulated by current members
of the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist has suggested that there is a special place for the
rights of the individual and that the courts might be part of the scheme of protection of

Although Thayer might reject this hypothesis, it does appear to be central to modern federalism as
discussed by Sue Davis. See infra note 26.
23

15
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

those rights. This position, articulated first by Thayer and later by Wechsler, may manifest
itself in the voting record of Chief Justice Rehnquist, but it may not emerge in the voting
behavior of Justice Scalia, who has not articulated a similar commitment.
III. Research Design
Very little quantitative analysis of judicial adherence to doctrine has occurred in
either political science or legal literature. The advantage of such an approach is that it
permits us to ascertain the degree to which the justices’ votes match the language they
craft in their opinions. Several political scientists have attempted similar analyses of legal
doctrines, but few have carefully tested an interest in federalism as a guiding judicial
principle.24 For this analysis, we collected data on any case decided by the Supreme Court
where the constitutionality of a state action was considered during the 1986-2002 terms of
the Supreme Court. Details of the research design, including a discussion of how the
ideology of the underlying state action was measures, are discussed in Appendix A.25
Additionally, each case was coded for the issue area covered by the Court, and we included
independent variables to measure cases that covered individual rights and raised
Supremacy Clause issues. Because the dependent variable (the justice votes to invalidate
or validate the government action under review) is dichotomous, probit is an appropriate
statistical tool, as we discuss in Appendix A. We present the results as the predicted
probability that a justice will vote to invalidate a state action.

Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for Deference? The Supreme Court and Judicial
Review, 57 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 131 (2004); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An
Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 113 (2002). See also Sue Davis,
Rehnquist and State Courts: Federalism Revisited, 45 WESTERN POL. Q. 774 (1992).
25 For a discussion of the role of these organizations, see J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton,
The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 233,
239 (2004). These two variables were, on average, negative. If states or state organizations file
amicus curiae briefs, they generally do so to urge the Court to uphold a state action.
24
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Turning to our first hypothesis, we suggest that a federalist will be sensitive to the
decisions rendered by state courts, particularly when state courts uphold choices made by
the other branches of state government.
Table 1: Predicted Probability of Rehnquist Voting to Affirm by Lower Court
Treatment

Lower Court
Decision

Type of Lower Court
Federal Court:
State Court:
Probability of Vote to Probability of Vote to
Affirm
Affirm
12.24%
Invalidated State Action
18.67%
62.38%
75.92%
Validated State Action

Table 1 reflects the predicted probability that Rehnquist will vote to affirm the lower
court decision. (Bold cell entries in all tables are statistically significant.) Chief Justice
Rehnquist votes to affirm state courts more often when they validate state action than
when they invalidate state action. And when the lower court has validated state action, he
votes to affirm state courts more frequently than he does federal courts.26 Sue Davis argues
for this view of federalism in her assessment of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist’s votes on
reviews of criminal convictions, conclud ing that a commitment to state autonomy means
allowing state courts to be the final arbiters of state policy.27 We observe this pattern of

The difference in rate of affirmance when the lower court invalidated state action is not
statistically significant. All of the other differences in predicted probabilities in Tables 1 are
statistically significant. For all of the tables, the baseline predicted probability is calculated based
on a case which was invalidated by a lower state court, was a conservative state action, did not
involve individual rights or premption, and had the average number of net amici for states (-6.07, or
6.07 states favoring validation) and state organizations (-.54, or .54 organizations favoring
validation). That baseline is 9.02% predicted probability of a vote to invalidate. Differences which
are statistically significantly different from that value will be marked by bold cell entries.
27 Sue Davis, Rehnquist and State Courts: Federalism Revisited , 45 WESTERN POL Q. 774 (1992).
Davis argues that Rehnquist rejects this respect for state courts in favor of ideology (reversing
decisions which overturn convictions and affirming those which uphold convictions). Our results
demonstrate that there appears to be some deference to state courts even after ideology has been
accounted for.
26
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greater deference to state court than federal court decisions, but only when a lower court
has validated the state action.
A federalist should also be sensitive to the articulated wishes of the states,
expressed by the states themselves in amicus briefs, or by organizations which represent
several state governments or go vernment officials. In any given case, the justices may not
be familiar with the sentiments of the states as a group: Massachusetts (or Texas) may be
pursuing a policy which many of the other states find odious, so a federalist may not know
where the weight of state interests lie. However, if states themselves or the organizations
which represent the states weigh in on the case in the form of amicus curiae briefs, then the
justices have a better sense of the collective wishes of the states. We argue that the more
states that favor invalidation of a state action, the more a federalist justice should be
willing to vote to invalidate the state action (the reverse would also be true). But we find
that amicus participation by state governments or by state government organizations does
not correlate with the voting behavior of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Table 2: Predicted Probability of Vote for Invalidation, States and
Intergovernmental Lobby as Amicus
Number of
signers on
briefs

Above Average favoring Invalidation
Average
Above Average favoring Validation

States
12.68%
12.24%
11.82%

State Orgs.
11.72%
12.24%
12.78%

A change in the number of states or state organizations signing briefs has no effect on the
predicted probability of Chief Justice Rehnquist voting to invalidate the government action.
On average, 4.7 states sign briefs to favor validation of state action. Increasing that
number by one standard deviation (16.6 states favoring validation) has no statistically
significant impact on the likelihood of Chief Justice Rehnquist voting to validate the
government action (the reverse is true as well). The effect of the intergovernmental lobby
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also lacks statistical significance: if anything, it is in the direction opposite of the one we
predicted. It appears that the efforts of states and of organizations which represent their
interests are wasted, at least insofar as Chief Justice Rehnquist is concerned.
We also hypothesize that federalists will be more deferential to the states than their
brethren who reject the label of federalist. This suggests that there is no absolute standard
by which a federalist can be judged, but rather that the justices’ behavior can only be
explained in relation to one another. For comparison to Chief Justice Rehnquist, we turn to
Justice Stevens, primarily because they have both served over the entire 1986-2002 period
under analysis here. If we expand our regression to include review of both state and federal
actions (and retain the same independent variables), it becomes clear that Justice Stevens
approaches state statutes with a more critical eye than he does federal statutes. The same
can not be said, however, for Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Table 3: Predicted Probability of Rehnquist and Stevens Voting to Invalidate
Government Action by Type of Government

Type of Action
Under Review

State Action
Federal Action

Rehnquist
12.24%
9.41%

Justice
Stevens
71.47%
49.47%

Justice Stevens is more than 20% more likely to vote to invalidate an action taken
by a state go vernment than one taken by the federal government, even after the ideological
direction of the underlying action (though it is assumed to be conservative for these models)
and the treatment by the lower courts are considered. Justice Rehnquist appears
nominally more likely to invalidate state than federal action, but the difference is not
statistically significant (it is for Justice Stevens). These results suggest that Chief Justice
Rehnquist comes closer to treating state governments as equal to the federal government
than does Justice Stevens.
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Like respect for state versus federal action, judicial restraint can only be understood
in a comparative context. To determine if Chief Justice Rehnquist and other justices who
claim to be federalists refrain from invalidating state action more than their colleagues, we
calculated overall invalidation rates for each of the nine current justices, and then assessed
the rate at which they invalidated liberal and conservative actions taken by the states.
Table 4: Predicted Invalidation Rate by Justice, Conservative and Liberal State
Action

Justice
Rehnquist
Scalia
Thomas
O’Connor
Kennedy
Ginsburg
Souter
Breyer
Stevens

Ideology of State
Action
Conservative Liberal
12.24%
12.86%
10.03%
21.83%
22.89%
80.66%
57.92%
64.50%
71.47%

28.53%
33.25%
31.99%
37.73%
33.97%
39.31%
28.29%
33.01%
32.74%

Absolute
Difference
16.29%
20.39%
21.96%
15.90%
11.08%
41.35%
29.63%
31.49%
38.73%

Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to qualify as a practitioner of judicial restraint, if
only by relative terms. While he certainly invalidates liberal state actions at a much
greater rate than he invalidates conservative state action, the difference in his predicted
invalidation rates for liberal and conservative state actions (16.29%) is smaller than every
other justice except Justices Kennedy and O’Connor. Notably, the predicted difference is
much smaller than that of the more liberal justices as well.28 Justice Rehnquist’s predicted
invalidation rate is also the lowest of the current nine justices on the Court. If judicial
restraint can be read as a reluctance to interfere with the policy decisions made by officials
Other quantitative analyses have suggested that the liberal justices appear to be more ideological
than the conservative justices. See Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for Deference?
The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 57 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 131 (2004).
28
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of the other branches, then Chief Justice Rehnquist, at least in relative terms, appears to
demonstrate some evidence of restraintist behavior. As reflected in the writings of
Rehnquist and Scalia, we also see that Scalia has a less restraintist perspective than
Rehnquist although he is more restrained than the nonfederalists. Our data therefore
supports the view that federalists are comparatively restrained even if they differ among
themselves in the degree to which they are restrained.
When looking at votes which assess the constitutionality of federal action, we find
that the overall rates do not change significantly, but the difference between rates of
invalidation for liberal and conservative government action are considerably greater. Table
5 reports these results.
Table 5: Invalidation Rate by Justice, Conservative and Liberal Federal Action

Justice
Rehnquist
Scalia
Thomas
O’Connor
Kennedy
Ginsburg
Souter
Breyer
Stevens

Ideology of Federal
Action
Conservative
Liberal
9.41%
9.32%
17.59%
9.91%
15.68%
81.25%
54.60%
51.3%
49.47%

23.57%
26.71%
45.25%
20.58%
24.87%
40.15%
25.50%
21.80%
15.20%

Absolute
Difference
14.16%
17.39%
27.66%
10.67%
9.19%
41.10%
29.10%
29.50%
34.27%

The liberal-conservative difference for Chief Justice Rehnquist is 14.16% for federal actions,
compared to 16.29% for state actions. Chief Justice Rehnquist does therefore appear to
engage in some form of judicial restraint, but an ideological component exists to his
decisions to validate or invalidate government actions.
When a claim about the use of the Supremacy Clause is raised, we hypothesize that
a federalist will be more likely to strike state action out of a desire to preserve the proper

21
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

place of the federal and state government. Calculating the predicted probability for cases
where federal preemption of state law is an issue, we find that Chief Justice Rehnquist is
much more likely to strike the state action than when preemption claims have not been
raised.
Table 6: Predicted Probability of Rehnquist Voting to Invalidate State Action,
Supremacy Clause Cases
State Action:

Preemption Not Issue
Preemption is the Issue

Rehnquist
12.24%
45.97%

When the Court chooses to decide a case on Supremacy Clause grounds, Chief
Justice Rehnquist becomes far more critical of state actions. In cases in the baseline
category, the invocation of a Supremacy Clause claim makes Rehnquist more than three
times more likely to vote to invalidate the state action under review. Most of the clearest
articulations of federalist doctrine have acknowledged that the preservation of a federal
system of government requires that both the state and federal government respect the
spheres of authority for one another. Our analysis here clearly suggests that Chief Justice
Rehnquist is not reluctant to use the authority of the Supreme Court to police those
boundaries when necessary.
Finally, one might expect that Rehnquist would be more protective of individual
rights than Justice Scalia, because he envisions a bigger role for Congress’ right to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment under its Section Five powers. These different views play out
when one evaluates their votes cast in cases where the validity of state action is at issue.29
The results for Rehnquist and Scalia are comparable as reflected in the table below. They

Cases dealing with individual rights are those dealing with First Amendment freedoms, Equal
Protection claims, Procedural Due Process, Substantive Due Process, and Sect. 1983 damage suits.
29
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are both somewhat more likely to invalidate state action when cases involve individual
rights but the difference is not statistically significant.
Table 7: Predicted Probability of Rehnquist Vote to Invalidate, Individual Rights
Cases
Justice
State Action:

Does not Involve Indiv. Rights
Involves Indiv. Rights

Rehnquist
12.24%
15.54%

Scalia
12.86%
15.28%

Finally, we note that the patterns which we have observed above generally
transcend voting strictly related to ideology. In the most absolute sense, a conservative
justice motivated solely by ideology would strike liberal state actions and uphold
conservative state actions. We find evidence of ideological behavior in Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s votes, but the ideological direction of the underlying statute is clearly not the
sole determinant of his votes. He is significantly more likely to strike liberal state actions
than conservative state actions, as demonstrated in Table 6.
Table 8: Predicted Probability of Vote to Invalidate, by Ideology of State Action
State Action:

Conservative
Liberal

Rehnquist
12.24%
28.53%

But ideology is not the sole determinant of Rehnquist’s voting behavior. As
demonstrated above, he is also sensitive to whether the case involves the issue of preemption, which government, state or federal, is acting, and what lower court handled the
case and what decision the lower court reached. If Chief Justice Rehnquist were motivated
only by ideology, we would not expect any other factor to be a significant predictor of his
votes.
IV. Conclusion
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Overall, we find general support for the proposition that Rehnquist behaves
according to the dictates of federalism. He demonstrates more respect for state courts than
federal courts, particularly when state courts validate state action. Rehnquist’s vision of
federalism appears to equate to that articulated by Sue Davis—respect for the decisions of
state courts, particularly when the state court affirms state action.
Rehnquist does not seem particularly solicitous of the requests made by the states or
the intergovernmental lobbyists as amicus curiae . Our results suggest that amicus briefs
by state actors do not have a significant effect on Rehnquist’s voting behavior. Because of
the increased proliferation of amicus briefs in recent years, this may be an important
finding. One explanation for this lack of effect is that the authors of amicus briefs do not
typically target Rehnquist because they consider his vote to be predictable. Instead, they
may be targeting the perceived “swing Justice” such as Justice O’Connor. We expect to
explore this issue further in future research.
Nonetheless, Rehnquist does fulfill the other criteria we outline for a federalist:
treating the states on a more equal basis to the federal government than nonfederalists,
exercising what appears to be judicial restraint, and respecting the proper r ole of the
federal and state governments when the Supremacy Clause is invoked.
Our empirical results suggest that the more restrained version of Rehnquist’s
federalism that appears in his opinions for the Court better reflect his federalism than his
dissents. His recent opinion in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs30in which
he wrote the opinion for the Court upholding the constitutionality of the Family and
Medical Leave Act is consistent with this restrained version of Rehnquist’s federalism.
Despite Rehnquist’s purported concern for the Fourteenth Amendment as an important
contributor to our system of government, we could find no evidence that Rehnquist has
30

538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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incorporated the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment into his version of federalism in
his individual rights decisions decided under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.31
Like the federalism of Scalia, Rehnquist’s federalism does not seem to be sensitive to the
importance of the Fourteenth Amendment in our federalist system.
One of our most interesting findings was that Rehnquist’s voting behavior can be
explained, in part, by the ideology of the underlying state action. This result is certainly
not surprising to social scientists who think that judicial voting behavior can be explained
entirely by politics. But, maybe surprisingly, we found that Rehnquist’s ideological
influence may be less than the ideological influence of many of the Courts’ liberals. This
finding also would benefit from further research but may be affected by the Court’s role in
defining its own docket, as well as the difficulty in applying the conservative/liberal label.
Whether government action is liberal or conservative appears to be a factor influencing
whether the Court accepts certiorari in a particular case. In our data base, the Supreme
Court reviewed (i.e. granted certiorari) in 455 instances of conservative government action
and only 153 liberal government actions. The large number of conservative government
actions under review is attributable, in large part, to the substantial number of criminal
law cases reviewed by the Court. Of the 455 conservative governmental actions, 209
involved criminal law cases.
Empirical analysis, however, has its limitations. We were not able to use empirical
tools to see if Rehnquist tended to be more deferential to Congress when Congress invoked
its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment than under the commerce
clause or spending power. The large number of criminal law cases may have skewed our
analysis. (230 of the 608 cases in the data base involved criminal law.) We did run our
Hibbs was decided under Section Five, not Section One, of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section
Five cases involve the scope of Congress’ power; Section One cases involve the question of whether
states violated the due process or equal protection rights of individuals.
31
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analysis, however, without the criminal law cases and the results did not change
significantly. Nonetheless, a more refined analysis of the criminal law category would be
useful given its large contribution to the data base. Finally, the amicus brief results
deserve further qualitative analysis. It may be obvious from reading the opinions of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, or another Justice, that a particular brief helped influence a result even
if that influence cannot be demonstrated through empirical research. A combination of
qualitative and quantitative analysis may be more appropriate in considering the influence
of amicus briefs on the voting behavior of a Justice.
Despite these limitations, our work can contribute to the research on the legacy of
Chief Justice Rehnquist. We are able to confirm that federalism, as opposed to purely
“politics,” predicts Chief Justice Rehnquist’s voting behavior over time. We are also able to
describe the judicial role that is consistent with his federalism: deference to state courts,
concern about protecting federal pre-emption, and a comparatively restrained judicial role
with some influence from political ideology. Although the Rehnquist Court may be well
known for its “federalism revolution,” Rehnquist appears to have helped move the Court in
that direction through a relatively cautious judicial approach.
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Appendix A: Methodology
Data was collected on any Supreme Court decision in the 1986-2002 terms which
considered the constitutionality of a state or federal action. The data was drawn from the
Supreme Court Database created by Harold Spaeth and archived by the S. Sidney Ulmer
Project at the University of Kentucky.32 The cases were then coded for several attributes,
including the primary issue considered in the case, the number of amicus briefs, and the
types and number of groups and individuals which signed on to briefs urging the Court to
validate or invalidate the government action under review. Information on the amicus
briefs was retrieved from the LEXIS Supreme Court briefs collection. If the LEXIS copies
of the briefs had incomplete information, student assistants looked at the microfiche copy of
the brief to get the total number of signers for each brief. Cases were coded for how the
lower court treated the government action under review (if it was a federal or state court, if
the lower court validated or invalidated the state action). Intergovernmental organizations
include groups like the National Conference of State Legislatures and the National
Governors Association.
Each case was also coded to reflect the ideology of the underlying government action.
Liberal actions are those which favored the person accused of a crime, favored the civil
rights or civil liberties claimant, favored affirmative action, favored neutrality in religion
cases, and are pro-union, pro-environmental protection, and pro-underdog in economic
disputes. The determination of the ideology of the underlying government action relied on
these definitions, derived from the Supreme Court database. A government action was
coded as liberal if the government action was invalidated and the Court decision was
considered conservative (in the Supreme Court database) or if the government action was
validated and the Court decision was coded as liberal. The underlying government action
was considered conservative if the government action was invalidated and the Court
decision was considered liberal (in the Supreme Court database) or if the government action
was validated and the Court decision was coded as conservative.
To calculate the predicted probabilities for the other justices in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 7, models
were run for each of the other 8 justices currently sitting on the Supreme Court. Because
the dependent variable is dichotomous—a justice votes to invalidate the case or to not
invalidate (that is, validate) the government action—the appropriate statistical technique is
probit, a maximum likelihood estimator. Probit coefficients are not particularly meaningful
on their own merits, so one way to bring meaning to them is to look at predicted
probabilities of a vote to invalidate given a particular case profile. The baseline profile we
use in the analyses in this chapter is a case which reviews a state government action (as
opposed to a federal government action), was invalidated by a state court before it came to
the Supreme Court, had no participation by the Solicitor General as an amicus, had the
average number of states supporting invalidation (-4.70 states, or 4.7 states favoring
validation), had the average number of intergovernmental lobby organizations (-.39, or .39
groups favoring validation) as amici. Additionally, the baseline case did not involve
individual rights or preemption. Perhaps most importantly, the baseline case is a review of
a government action that is conservative.

32
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The full probit model for Chief Justice Rehnquist’s votes is below, with standard errors in
parentheses. There are 604 observations, and * denotes coefficients significant at the .05
level (two-tailed test), and ** denotes coefficients significant at the .01 level.
Federal Action
Lower Court-Federal Court Validated
Lower Court-State Court Validated
Lower Court-Federal Court Invalidated
Solicitor General Amicus Favoring Validation
Solicitor General Amicus Favoring Invalidation
Net Number of States Favoring Invalidation
State Government Organizations Favoring Invalidation
Ideology of Challenged Government Action
Issue in case is individual rights
Issue in case is preemption
Constant

-0.1532
(0.1636)
0.8474**
(0.2298)
0.4590*
(0.2085)
0.2727
(0.2205)
-0.4575**
(0.1610)
0.4491*
(0.2198)
0.0018
(0.0053)
-0.0145
(0.0330)
0.5959**
(0.1291)
0.1495
(0.1245)
1.0573**
(0.2394)
-1.1602**
(.1993)
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